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NON-NATURAL PERSONS AND THE GUARANTEE OF
"LIBERTY" UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
By D. J. FARAG,*
Perhaps no case before the Supreme Court from Schechter
Poultry Corporation v. United States' to the present has at-
tracted more widespread attention and interest than Hague v.
Committee for Industrial Organization2 decided during the last
term of court. Having affirmed, in substantial measure, a
lower court decree enjoining Mayor Hague and other Jersey
City officials from deporting C. I. 0. speakers and sympathizers,
arresting them without bringing them to trial, and preventing
the holding of meetings and the distribution of leaflets and
printed matter, the decision has been hailed as a sweeping
victory for civil liberties.
The stress placed upon the significance of the affirmance,
however, has tended to obscure at least one particular in which
the lower court decree was held erroneous. The bill for the
injunction had been brought, inter alia, by the C. I. 0. and
several other unincorporated labor unions, and by the American
Civil Liberties Union, a corporation whose avowed purpose
is to aid in the preservation of "civil liberties." The lower
courts had recognized the standing of these parties as entitling
them to the relief sought. The Supreme Court, while sub-
stantially sustaining the decree as to the individual plaintiffs,
held that the constitutional protection could be invoked only
by natural persons as distinguished from "artificial" ones and
dismissed the proceedings as to the labor associations and the
* Prof. of Law, Dickinson School of Law, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
A.B. 1930, LL.B. 1933, University of Pennsylvania. Prof. of Law, Dick-
inson School of Law, since 1935. Pub. various articles in law reviews.
a295 U. S. 495, 55 Sup. Ct. 837 (1935).
2- U. S. -, 59 Sup. Ct. 954 (1939).
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American Civil Liberties Union. 3 It is to a consideration of this
part of the decision denying the right of non-natural persons
to claim protection as to "civil liberties" that this paper is
dedicated.
In the Federal Constitution, the chief source of immunity,
whether of real or artificial persons, against unreasonable state
encroachment upon freedom of speech and assembly or property
is the Fourteenth Amendment. Two clauses of the first Section
thereof were variously relied upon by the majority in sustaining
the decree as to the individual plaintiffs. Mr. Justice Roberts,
in an opinion receiving the concurrence of Mr. Justice Black,
held that federal jurisdiction in the case found its basis in
defendants' violation of the privileges and immunities clause.
4
On the other hand, 'Mr. Justice Stone, with the concurrence
of Mr. Justice Reed and apparently that of Chief Justice
Hughes, denied the propriety of invoking that clause and
instead saw federal jurisdiction arising from defendants'
violation of the due process clause.5  Which of the two
theories more properly justifies assumption of jurisdiction is
a question that has received attention elsewhere.0 It is note-
worthy, however, that the opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts is
not necessarily at odds with that of Mr. Justice Stone as to the
propriety of basing jurisdiction on the due process clause. For
while Mr. Justice Stone denied that the record indicated a
violation of the privileges and immunities clause, there is no
attempt in the opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts to deny that the
facts involved a violation of the due process as well as of the
privileges and immunities clause.1
If, in cases like Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organiza-
tion, seeking immunity for free speech and assembly, the latter
clause were the only applicable constitutional provision, the
Specifically, only the American Civil Liberties Union was men-
tioned in the opinions. However, it is clearly stated that "only the
individual respondents may . . . maintain this suit," Id. at -, 59
Sup. Ct. 954, 963; and all the judges composing the majority apparently
concurred in dismissing "as to all save the individual plaintiffs." Id.
at -, 59 Sup. Ct. 954, 965.
4"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States."
r "Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law."
" The Hague Case in the Supreme Court, International Juridical
Association Monthly Bulletin, Vol. 8, No. 1, p. 1, July 1939.
71d. at 6.
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right of non-natural persons to invoke its aid would stand
opposed by a long line of cases holding that a corporation is
not a citizen within the meaning of the privileges and immu-
nities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. s There appears to
be no authority determining whether an unincorporated as-
sociation will be deemed a citizen within that clause, but it is
hardly likely that such an association would be given pref-
erential treatment over corporations, especially in view of the
reliance placed by the corporation cases upon the language of
Paul v. Virginia, that "only natural persons" are protected by
the privileges and immunities clause.9
On the other hand, if immunity for speech and assembly
comes from the due process clause, as suggested by Mr. Justice
Stone, the composite story of the rights of non-natural persons
presents a different picture. A line of cases, imposing for its
length as for uniformity of result achieved, supports the view
that a corporation is a "person" within the due process clause
insofar as it forbids deprivation of property. Indeed, the pro-
tection accorded to the property of corporations under this
clause has been so extensive as to provoke criticism. 10 Similarly,
Grosjeau v. American Press Company, 297 U. S. 233, 56 Sup. Ct.
444 (1936); see cases collected in 3 U. S. Const. Anno. p. 15, note 19, as
supplemented. Cf. the interstate privileges and immunities clause of
the Constitution, art. iv, See. 2, cl. 1, as construed by Paul v. Vir-
ginia, S Wall. 168, 19 L. Ed. 357 (U. S. 1869), and cases collected in
2 U. S. Const. Anno. p. 373, note 3. Rottschaeffer, HANDBOOK or AmERi-
CIAN CONSTITUTiOx LAW, p. 124. Cases refusing to treat corporations as
citizens within the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment have often done so in reliance on the analagous construc-
tion given by Paul v. Virginia to the interstate privileges and immuni-
ties clause under which only natural persons may claim. See Orient
Insurance Company v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 561, 19 Sup. Ct. 231 (1899);
Grosjean v. American Press Company, 297 U. S. 233, 244, 56 Sup. Ct.
444, 447.
Apart from the effect of these cases, the scope of the protection
accorded by the privileges and immunities clause would be narrower
than that of the due process clause in two other particulars: (1) The
former would apply to "citizens" but not to aliens, the latter to all
"persons." (2) The former would not give protection to speech or
assembly not related to some national issue. See opinion of Mr. Justice
Stone, Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, - U. S. -,
-, 59 Sup. Ct. 954, 968, and United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542,
552, 23 Sup. Ct. 538, 591 (1876).
See note 8, *wpra.
o Compare the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Black in McCart
v. Indianapolis Water Company 302 U. S. 419, 423, - Sup. Ct. -, -
(1937), and in Connecticut General Life Insurance Company v. John-
son, 303 U. S. 77, 83, - Sup. Ct. - (1938); and note his failure to con-
cur in the third part of Mr. Justice Stone's majority opinion in United
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unincorporated associations have been accorded immunity under
this provision.1 1
However, the Supreme Court's position as to whether non-
natural persons are entitled to the "liberty" guaranteed by the
due process clause is not entirely clear. The opinions in Hague
v. Committee for Industrial Organization, in giving a negative
answer make no attempt at explanation beyond citing two earlier
cases as precedent: Northwestern National Life Insurance Com-
pany v. Riggs12 and Western Turf Association v. Greenburg.'8
As the supposedly leading cases denying to non-natural persons
the protection of the "liberty" guaranteed by the due process
clause, these two decisions invite examination.
The former involved the validity of a Missouri statute
which, as applied to a foreign insurance company, cut off any
defense on its insurance policies based upon false statements
of insured on his application, unless the matter misrepresented
actually contributed to insured's death. Pointing out that
the same statute, as applied to a local insurance company, had
previously been sustained by it, the Supreme Court again upheld
the act as a reasonable exercise of the state police power to
correct abuses resulting from the insertion of clauses in insurance
policies which enabled insurers to avail themselves of insured's
misrepresentations, however remote their relation to the cause
of death, without a return of premiums paid by insured. Con-
cluding that the statute did not deprive the insurance company
of its "liberty" or "property" without due process, the court
said:
"The business of life insurance is of such a peculiar character, affects
so many people, and is so intimately connected with the common
good that the state ... may, without transcending the limits of legis-
lative power, regulate their affairs, so far, at least, as to prevent them
from committing wrong or injustice in the exercise of their corporate
functions.""4
It will be noted that the ultimate disposition of this case,
unlike Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, did not
require resort to any doctrine disqualifying non-natural persons
States v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U. S. 144, 155, - Sup. Ct. -
(1938) where some recognition is given to the so-called substantive
effect of the due process clause.
n Cf. Flexner v. Farson, 248 U. S. 289, 39 Sup. Ct. 97 (1919).
" 203 U. S. 243, 27 Sup. Ct. 126 (1906).
13204 U. S. 359, 27 Sup. Ct. 384 (1907).
14203 U. S. 243, 254, 27 Sup. Ct. 126, 129.
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from invoking the "liberty" or "property" guarantees of the
due process clause. As a reasonable exercise of the police power,
the insurance statute would not have been violative of the rights
or immunities even of natural persons. But the Hague case
denies to non-naturals protection otherwise accorded to natural
persons against admitted abuses. When, therefore, the Court,
in Northwestern National Insurance Company v. Riggs, con-
cludes with the statement that "the liberty referred to in that
amendment is the liberty of natural, not artificial persons,'" 5
this observation must be recognized as dictum. Moreover, it
should be observed that no explanation or authority is given
in support.
The second case, Western Turf Association v. Greenberg,
involved the validity of a California statute which made it un-
lawful for "any corporation, person, or association," operating
an amusement resort, to refuse admittance to any person pre-
senting a ticket of admission, unless such person was drunk,
unruly, boisterous, or otherwise objectionable. In an action by
a ticket holder to recover a penalty from a corporation operating
a race track, for violation of the statute, the Supreme Court,
denying that the act was arbitrary or oppressive, upheld the
statute as within the police power of the state. As in North-
westerz National Insurance Company v. Riggs, the statue would
not have violated the "liberty" or "property" provisions of
the due process clause even in respect to natural persons. Again,
therefore, the utterance in the ticket cases that the guarantee
of "liberty" inures only to natural persons' 6 is pure dictum.
Still a third case, not mentioned in Hague v. Committee for
Ildustrial Organization, pays lip service to the dogma. In
Pierce v. Society of Sisters,'7 a state statute compelling parents
to send children to public schools was held unconstitutional as
depriving an incorporated private school of property witliout
due process. Mr. Justice MeReynolds, having found the Society
entitled to injunctive relief on that ground, his denial (again
unsupported by reasoning or explanation, and merely referring
to the first two cases) that corporations may claim immunity
15Id. at 255, 27 Sup. Ct. 126, 129.
14204 U. S. 259, 363, 27 Sup. Ct. 384, 386. Again, no explanation or
reason is given, and only Northwestern Insurance Company v. Riggs
is cited as authority.
17 268 U. S. 510, 45 Sup. Ct. 570 (1925).
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as to their "liberty" is mere dictum. In a word, therefore,
Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, in repeating
this doctrine of disqualification, rests only upon dicta for which
no reasoning or explanation has ever been advanced.
The juxtaposition of "liberty" with "property" in the
due process clause hardly lends plausibility to a construction
which simultaneously envisions non-natural persons as within
the scope of the protection of the one term but not within the
protection of the other. It may, of course, be suggested that
the word "liberty" implies freedom only from physical restraint
and that, in that sense of the term, non-natural or fictitious
persons, having no physical form capable of being restrained,
are not pro tanto intended beneficiaries of the due process clause.
In fact, writers from time to time have argued, on the basis
of historical data, that the term "liberty" should be con-
strued narrowly as safeguarding freedom only from personal
confinement.1 s
Accepting for the moment this narrow interpretation of
the term, and conceding the lack of realism in permitting an
artificial person to set up an alleged deprivation of "liberty"
in that sense, it is perhaps reasonable, nonetheless, to inquire
whether there is any greater realism in assuming that an
artificial person may "possess" and "own" property within
the meaning of the due process clause, or in assuming that a
non-natural entity may be personified for the purpose of sub-
jection to charges of libel or contempt. There is, it would seem,
as much fiction in the one as in the other unless realism is
measured in terms of common practice and acceptance.
Whatever the speculations as to the proper interpretation
of "liberty" on the basis of historical data, and however well
founded they may be, there can be no doubt that the pronounce-
ments of the Supreme Court give the term the broadest scope. 10
Not only has the Court expressly denied that "liberty" con-
'I Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term "Liberty" In Those
Clauses in the Federal and State Constitutions which Protect "Life,
Liberty, and Property" (1891) 4 Harv. L. Rev. 365, 2 Selected Essays
on Constitutional Law 185. Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the
Fourteenth Amendment (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 431, 2 Selected Essays
on Constitutional Law 237.
'-9Even writers advocating the narrower interpretation concede
that the Court's policy has been to broaden the content of the term.
See articles cited in note 18, supra.
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notes freedom only from physical restraint,20 but it has affirm-
atively construed the term:
"To embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of
all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live
and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling;
to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter
into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to
his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above
mentioned."' '
Similiarly, freedom of speech and of the press has been
held within the scope of "liberty". 22 Whatever the difficulties
inherent in establishing that an artificial person can be phys-
ically restrained, it would seem that the labor associations in
Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization would not be
any more hard put to show deprivation of liberty under the
broad definition of the Court, than to show deprivation of
property.
Nor has the Court contented itself with adopting a broad
construction of "liberty" as respects the protection extended to
natural persons. Ignoring the dicta in Northwestern National
Life Insurance Company v. Riggs, Western Turf Association v.
Greenberg, and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Supreme Court
had squarely held, prior to Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization, that corporations are persons entitled to the guar-
antee of "liberty".
In Grosjean v. American Press Company,23 a unanimous
Court held that a Louisiana state tax on certain corporate news-
paper publishers was so oppressive as to violate freedom of the
press. After holding that the term "liberty" embraces free-
dom of speech and of the press, Mr. Justice Sutherland, while
conceding that corporations are not citizens within the privileges
and immunities clause, denied the contention that corporations
were not entitled to invoke the protection of the due process
0Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 389, 17 Sup. Ct. 427- (1897); Smith
v. Texas, 233 U. S. 630, 34 Sup. Ct. 681 (1914); Grosjean v. American
Press Company, 297 U. S. 233, 56 Sup. Ct. 444 (1936); Cf. Hardware
Dealers' Mutual Fire Insurance Company of Wisconsin v. Glidden Com-
pany, 284 U. S. 151, 52 Sup. Ct. 69 (1931). For other cases, see 3 U. S.
Const. Anno. p. 58, notes 30 and 31.
S165 U. S. 389, -.
A Grosjean v. American Press Company, 297 U. S. 233, 56 Sup. Ct.
444 (1936); Near v. State of Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625
(1931). For other cases see 3 U. S. Const. Anno. p. 58, note 30, and
supplement.
1297 U. S. 233, 56 Sup. Ct. 444 (1936).
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clause. The earlier dicta were not honored by reference. In
turn, Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization does not
mention Grosjean v. American Press Company.
In Adkins v. Children's Hospital,24 a divided Court held
a minimum wage law unconstitutional as violating the "liberty"
guaranteed by the due process clause of a corporate employer
freely to contract. The Court implicitly recognized that a
corporation was within the protection of the term "liberty".
Of that case, too, Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organiza-
tion makes no mention. Similarly, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,25
by holding, inter alia, that delegation, to producers of two-thirds
of the annual tonnage of coal (some of the producers being
corporations), of legislative power to fix wages and hours for
miners constituted an "unconstitutional interference with the
personal liberty and private property''26 of producers of
the other one-third in violation of the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment, the Court implicitly recognizes that corpora-
tions may avail themselves of the guarantee of "liberty".
To these cases, extending the mantle of the due process
clause to the "liberties" of corporations, it may be objected that
essentially economic or property interests were being protected,
rather than pure "civil liberties", and that the immunity found
in the due process clause against deprivation of property suf-
fices to justify the results. The answer, of course, is that pro-
tection of "liberties", as that term has been defined by the
Court, invariably results in protection of property interests, and
vice versa. Conversely, even a natural person may not be
deprived of "liberty" without effecting an incidental restraint
upon his enjoyment of his property. The Supreme Court, too,
has sensed the fusion of the interests in "liberty" and "prop-
erty". Thus, unreasonable interference with the "right" to
labor, pursue an occupation, or engage in business, has been
viewed at one time as an interference with "liberty",27 at
another, as an interference with "property". 28 Indeed, this
fusion exposes the fallacy of simultaneously construing the
-261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394 (1923). Overruled on other grounds
by West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 57 Sup. 578
(1937).
1 298 U. S. 238, 56 Sup. Ct. 855 (1936).
211d. at 312, 56 Sup. Ct. 855, 873.
"I See cases collected in 3 U. S. Const. Anno. p. 58, note 30.
2 See cases collected in 3 U. S. Const. Anno. p. 60, notes 39-41.
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two terms, "liberty" and "property", variously as regards
their application to non-natural persons, notwithstanding their
side-by-side existence. For attempts at separation of one from
the other must inevitably follow the same illusory course and
are doomed to the same failure that has marked efforts to enforce
a rigid separation of executive, legislative, and judicial functions
under the so-called "separation of powers" doctrine.
Pausing, then, to take stock of the authorities, it appears
that the dismissal of the suit as to non-natural persons in Hague
v. Coiimittee for Industrial Organ ization can be supported only
on the basis of dicta, and that it ignores a number of square or
implicit holdings sustaining a contrary viewpoint. There re-
mains for consideration only a brief appraisal of the con-
sequences of precluding invocation by corporations and other
non-natural persons of the "liberty" guarantee.
Sporadically, the wisdom of allowing corporations to take
shelter anzywhere within the due process clause has been ques-
tioned. ' 9 Aside from Mr. Justice Black, however, no member
of the Court has indicated any disposition to withdraw from non-
natural persons the immunity against deprivation of "property"
without due process. No argument, apart from that of inter-
pretation already discussed, has been advanced or su6,gests itself
which, while justifying recognition of that immunity, impels
denial of that against deprivation of "liberty". Rather, the
implications of such a policy are no less than alarming. Thus,
to recede from the position of Grosjean v. American Press Com-
pany in this day of corporate radio and newspaper activity
merely because of the artifical character of the litigant, would
be to deny protection as to free speech at the necessary and
principal sources of public information where such protection
is most needed.
As regards labor, its freedom to organize, to appeal to
the public for support, and to openly air its grievances against
the employer has been recognized as a hard-won, lawful, effective,
and almost indispensable aid for economic advancement. But
recognition of the necessity and lawfulness of labor organization
will be a futile gesture if the union is not to be accorded im-
munity as to its "liberty" to speak frankly and openly for its
membership. To restrict the benefits of the guarantee of
2 See note 10, supra.
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"liberty" to natural persons is backhandedly to impair and
discourage the function of the union. To be sure, individual
members may sue in their own names to restrain unreasonable
interference with their freedom of speech. But to compel all
the members to sue severally or to join in one action brought
in their own names is to retreat from the Supreme Court's
position in United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal
Co. (the Coronado Coal CaseO) which pointed out that:
"Out of the very necessities of the existing conditions, and the
utter impossibility of doing justice otherwise, the suable character
of such an organization as this has come to be recognized in some
jurisdictions, and many suits for and against labor unions are reported
in which no question has been raised as to the right to treat them
In their closely united action and functions as artificial persons
capable of suing and being sued.""
As for the American Civil Liberties Union, as to which the
suit was also dismissed in Hague v. Committee for Industrial
Organization, more facts than those indicated by the opinions in
the case are necessary for a proper appraisal of the Court's
action. If its representatives were restrained by the defendants
from circulating leaflets on its behalf or from otherwise advanc-
ing its purposes by speech or writing, the Union's right to enjoin
the defendants would appear to be no less than that of the
publishers in Grosjean v. American Press Company to enjoin
interference with its publications. On the other hand, if the
American Civil Liberties Union was complaining solely on behalf
of the labor unions, the dismissal of the suit as to it might well
be sustained on the principle that one not himself aggrieved
may not invoke constitutional safeguards on behalf of third
persons who are affected.
32
Readverting to the fact that the majority in Hague v. Com-
mittee for Industrial Organization divided upon the question
whether jurisdiction was based upon infringement of the due
process clause, on the one hand, or the privileges and immunities
clause, on the other, it need not necessarily follow that the
resuscitation of the policy in Grosjean v. American Press Com-
" United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Company
259 U. S. 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 570 (1922).31 Id. at 387, 42 Sup. Ct. 570, 575.
32 Of. George Moore Ice Cream Company v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373,
53 Sup. Ct. 620 (1933); Young Company v. McNeal-Edwards Company,
283 U. S. 398, 51 Sup. Ct. 538 (1931); Adams v. American Agricultural
Chemical Company, 78 Fla. 362, 82 So. 850 (1919).
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pany will be obstructed by the association, in the opinion of Mr.
Justice Roberts, of freedom of speech and of the press with the
privileges and immunities clause, the protection of which has
been uniformly denied to corporations. For, as noted earlier,
Mir. Justice Roberts, while basing jurisdiction on the privileges
and immunities clause, does not deny that the due process
clause may also be available for the same purpose.
In recent months, the Court has shown a disposition to
re-examine authorities. Reason rather than precedent seems the
order of the day. Mlay there be early reconsideration of
this doctrine of disqualification first enforced in Hagte v. Com-
mittee for Industrial Organization, and may the result, whether
it be to affirm or overrule, rest on reasoning and analysis instead
of merely reflecting homage to unquestioned dicta of the past.
K. L. J.-2
